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Abstract—In this study, we investigate fundamental trade-off
among identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates
in biometric identification system. Ignatenko and Willems (2015)
studied this system assuming that the channel in the enrollment
process of the system is noiseless and they did not consider the
template rate. In the enrollment process, however, it is highly
considered that noise occurs when bio-data is scanned. In this
paper, we impose a noisy channel in the enrollment process and
characterize the capacity region of the rate tuples. The capacity
region is proved by a novel technique via two auxiliary random
variables, which has never been seen in previous studies. As
special cases, the obtained result shows that the characterization
reduces to the one given by Ignatenko and Willems (2015) where
the enrollment channel is noiseless and there is no constraint on
the template rate, and it also coincides with the result derived
by Günlü and Kramer (2018) where there is only one individual.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric security is a security mechanism used to identify
an individual on the basis of his/her physical characteristics.
Biometric technology enables us to recognize the individual
by matching the unique feature with biological data (bio-
data) already stored in the system database. Some well-known
technologies of this kind of security are fingerprint-based
identification, iris-based identification, voice recognition, etc.
Nowadays many applications make use of this technology
like homeland checking at land port, mobile payment with
smartphone and so on.
O’Sullivan and Schmid [1] and Willems et al. [2] in-
dependently introduced the discrete memoryless biometric
identification system (BIS). Basically, the BIS consists of two
phases: (I) Enrollment Phase and (II) Identification Phase. In
(I) Enrollment Phase, all individuals’ bio-data sequences are
generated from a stationary memoryless source. The sequences
are observed through a noisy discrete memoryless channel
(DMC) and stored into system database. In (II) Identification
Phase, a bio-data sequence of an unknown individual is
observed via another noisy DMC, and an estimated value of
the unknown individual is output.
There are many studies related to the BIS. We highlight
some previous studies which are deeply connected to this
study. Willems et al. [2] have clarified the identification capac-
ity of the BIS, which is the maximum achievable rate of the
number of individuals when the error probability converges to
zero as the length of bio-data sequences goes to infinity. How-
ever, the system model in [2] assumes that bio-data sequences
are stored in the system database in a plain form, leading to
a critical privacy leakage threat. Tuncel [3] has extended their
model by incorporating compression of bio-data sequences
stored in the system database and clarified the capacity region
of identification and coding rates (in this study, a codeword is
called a template, and this coding rate is called the template
rate). Later, Ignatenko and Willems [4] investigated the BIS
model with secret data and template generation. Related to
this work, the system with only secrecy estimation has been
analyzed in [5]–[7]. In [4], the authors evaluated the amount of
information leaked between a template stored in the database
and its bio-data sequence, called the privacy-leakage rate,
and clarified the fundamental trade-off among identification,
secrecy and privacy-leakage rates in the BIS provided that the
enrollment channel is noiseless. Recently, Yachongka and Yagi
[8] introduced a constraint of the template rate to the model
developed in [4] and clarified the fundamental trade-off among
identification, secrecy, and template rates in the BIS.
An interesting observation given in [4] for the case where
the secrecy rate is zero and in [8] for the case where the
secrecy rate is positive indicates that the minimum required
amount of the template rate is equal to the minimum required
amount of the privacy-leakage rate when the enrollment chan-
nel is noiseless. Despite this insight, when bio-data is scanned
and stored in the system database, it is highly considerable
that bio-data sequences are subject to noise, as is assumed
in [2], [3], and [9]. Actually, by treating a noisy enrollment
channel, the problem becomes more challenging and interest-
ing, especially, in the evaluation of the privacy-leakage rate.
This motivates us to consider a noisy channel in the enrollment
phase of the BIS.
In this paper, we aim to characterize the capacity region of
identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in
the BIS. In order to get closer to practical system, we analyze
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the region by imposing the following requirements:
1) there is a noisy channel in the enrollment phase,
2) we consider a scheme of both protecting privacy (e.g.,
[4], [6]) and compressing template (e.g., [3], [8]),
3) we analyze the capacity region provided that the prior
distribution of an identified individual is unknown.
To handle the difficulties of bounding the privacy-leakage
in the achievability proof, we introduce a virtual system
with a partial decoder, which outputs only the secret data
of individual. We show that there are two different ways
to express the capacity region of the BIS. An expression
uses a single auxiliary random variable (RV) and another
requires two auxiliary RVs. Later, we will demonstrate that
the two regions (regions with one and two auxiliary RVs)
are technically identical in Remark 3. Although there are two
different aspects, we provide the proof of our main result based
on the one employing two auxiliary RVs. Some benefits of
deriving via two auxiliary RVs are that the achievability proof
can be done in a simpler form since each rate constraint is
addressed individually. The characterization of the capacity
region of the BIS is basically similar to the ones given in
[4], [6], and [8]. As special cases, it can be checked that our
characterization reduces to the one given by Ignatenko and
Willems [4] where the enrollment channel is noiseless and
there is no constraint on the template rate, and it also coincides
with the result derived by Günlü and Kramer [6] where there
is only one individual, and thus individual’s estimation is not
necessary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II,
we define notation used in this paper and describe the details
of the system model. In Sect. III, we present our main result.
Next, we provide the detailed proofs of the main result in Sect.
IV. Finally, in Sect. V, we give some concluding remarks and
future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we define notation used in this paper and
describe the details of the system model within information
theoretic framework.
A. Notation
Calligraphic A stands for a finite alphabet. Upper-case A
denotes a RV taking values in A and lower-case a ∈ A denotes
its realization. PA(a) := Pr[A = a], a ∈ A, represents
the probability distribution on A, and PAn represents the
probability distribution of RV An = (A1, · · · , An) in An,
the n-th Cartesian product of A. PAnBn represents the joint
probability distribution of a pair of RVs (An, Bn) and its
conditional probability distribution PAn|Bn is defined as
PAn|Bn(an|bn) = PA
nBn(a
n, bn)
PBn(bn)
(∀an ∈ An,∀bn ∈ Bn such that PBn(bn) > 0). (1)
The entropy of RV A is denoted by H(A), the joint entropy
of RVs A and B is denoted by H(A,B), and the mutual
information between A and B is denoted by I(A;B) [11].
Throughout this paper, logarithms are of base two. For integers
a and b such that a ≤ b, [a, b] denotes the set {a, a+1, · · · , b}.
A partial sequence of a sequence cn from the first symbol to
the tth symbol (c1, · · · , ct) is represented by ct.
Here, we define the strong typicality property and use the
same notation as in [11]. A sequence xn ∈ Xn is said to
be δ-strongly typical with respect to a distribution pX on
X if | 1nN(a|xn) − PX(a)| ≤ δ and PX(a) = 0 implies
1
nN(a|xn) = 0 for all a ∈ X , where N(a|xn) is the number
of occurrences of a in the sequence xn, and δ is an arbitrary
positive number. The set of sequences xn ∈ Xn such that xn
is δ-strongly typical is called the strongly typical set and is
denoted by A(n) (X). This concept is easily extended to joint
distributions.
B. Model Descriptions
The BIS model assumed in this paper is shown in Fig. 1.
As we have previously mentioned, it consists of two phases:
(I) Enrollment Phase and (II) Identification Phase. Next we
explain the details of each phase.
Fig. 1. BIS model
(I) Enrollment Phase:
Let I = [1,MI ] and X be the set of indexes of individuals
and a finite source alphabet, respectively. For any i ∈ I, we
assume that xni = (xi1, · · · , xin) ∈ Xn, an n-length bio-data
sequence of individual i, is generated i.i.d. from a stationary
memoryless source PX . The generating probability for each
sequence xni ∈ Xn is
PXn
i
(xni ) := Pr[X
n
i = x
n
i ] =
n∏
k=1
PX(xik). (2)
Now let J = [1,MJ ] and S = [1,MS ] be the set
of indexes of templates stored in database and individuals’
secret data, respectively. All bio-data sequences are observed
via a stationary DMC {Y, PY |X ,X}, where Y is a finite
output-alphabet of PY |X . The corresponding probability that
xni ∈ Xn is observed as yni = (yi1, yi2, · · · , yin) ∈ Yn via
the DMC PY |X is
PY n
i
|Xn
i
(yni |xni ) =
n∏
k=1
PY |X(yik|xik) (3)
for all i ∈ I. Afterwards, the observed bio-data sequence Y ni
is encoded into template J(i) ∈ J and secret data S(i) ∈ S
as
f(Y ni ) = (J(i), S(i)) (i ∈ I), (4)
where f : Yn −→ J × S denotes encoding function.
The corresponding template J(i) is a compressed version of
sequence Y ni and stored at position i in the database, which
can be accessed by the decoder. Contrarily, the secret data
s(i) is returned to individual i and kept as confidential. We
denote the database as JMI = {J(1), · · · , J(MI)} for brevity
purpose in the upcoming analyses.
(II) Identification Phase:
Bio-data sequence xnw (w ∈ I) of an unknown w (index of
individual w having enrolled in the database) is observed via
a DMC {Z, PZ|X ,X}, where Z is a finite output-alphabet
of PZ|X . The probability that xnw ∈ Xn is output as zn =
(z1, z2, · · · , zn) ∈ Zn via PZ|X is given by
PZn|Xnw(z
n|xnw) =
n∏
k=1
PZ|X(zk|xwk). (5)
The decoder observers the identified sequence Zn and esti-
mates the pair of index and secret data by comparing Zn with
all templates JMI in the database (Ŵ , ̂S(W )) = g(Zn,JMI ),
where g denotes decoding function.
Remark 1. Note that the distribution of PX , PY |X , and
PZ|X are assumed to be known or fixed and RV W is
independent of (Xni , Y
n
i , J(i), S(i), Z
n) for all i ∈ I like
previous studies. But, in this paper we assume neither that the
identified individual index W are uniformly distributed over
I nor that there is a prior distribution of W .
The motivation to analyze performance of the BIS provided
that the distribution of I is unknown is that the identified fre-
quencies of each individual are likely different. For example, it
is hard to think that the frequencies of coming to use a bank
teller of each individual are identical. For real applications,
this assumption is important to take care of.
III. DEFINITIONS AND MAIN RESULTS
The formal definition and main theorem of this study are
given below.
Definition 1. The tuple of an identification, secrecy, template,
privacy-leakage rates (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is said to be achiev-
able if for any δ > 0 and large enough n there exist pairs of
encoders and decoders that satisfy
max
i∈I
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ δ, (6)
1
n
logMI ≥ RI − δ, (7)
min
i∈I
1
n
H(S(i)) ≥ RS − δ, (8)
1
n
logMJ ≤ RJ + δ, (9)
max
i∈I
1
n
I(S(i); J(i)) ≤ δ, (10)
max
i∈I
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)) ≤ RL + δ. (11)
Moreover, the capacity region R is defined as the closure of
the set of all achievable rate tuples.
In Definition 1, (6) is the condition of the maximum error
probability of an individual i, which is arbitrarily small.
Equations (7)–(9) are the constraints related to identification,
secrecy, and template rates, respectively. In term of the privacy
protection perspective, we measure the information leakage of
individual i by (10) and (11). Condition (10) measures the
secrecy-leakage between the template in the database and the
secret data of individual i, and it requires that the maximum
leaked amount is not greater than δ. Condition (11) measures
the amount of privacy-leakage of original bio-data Xni from
template J(i) and its maximum value must be smaller than or
equal to RL + δ.
Remark 2. In [4], a stronger requirement that the distribution
of secret data of every individual must be almost uniform, i.e.
1
nH(S(i)) + δ ≥ 1n logMS , is included in (8). However, this
requirement was not actually necessary in the general problem
formulation.
Theorem 1. The capacity region for the BIS is given by
R = A1, (12)
where A1 is defined as
A1 = {(RI ,RS , RJ , RL) :
RI +RS ≤ I(Z;U),
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) +RI ,
RL ≥ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI ,
RI ≥ 0, RS ≥ 0
for some U s.t. Z −X − Y − U}, (13)
where auxiliary RV U takes values in a finite alphabet U with
|U| ≤ |Y|+ 2.
Fig. 2. The rate region of the BIS
Fig. 3. Projection of the rate region onto RJRI -plain
Remark 3. We define a region A2 as
A2 = {(RI ,RS , RJ , RL) :
0 ≤ RI ≤ I(Z;V ),
0 ≤ RS ≤ I(Z;U)− I(Z;V ),
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ),
RL ≥ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ),
for some U and V s.t. Z −X − Y − U − V },
(14)
where auxiliary RVs U and V take values in some finite
alphabets U and V with |U| ≤ (|Y| + 2)(|Y| + 3) and
|V| ≤ |Y|+ 3. Then, it can be verified that
A1 = A2 (15)
for which the proof is given in Appendix A. In this paper,
we will prove Theorem 1 based on the rate constraints of the
region A2 instead of A1.
As we have previously mentioned, one can check that
the characterization of Theorem 1 coincides with the region
characterized by Ignatenko and Willems [4, Theorem 1] in two
steps: first replace Y by X and then remove the constraint
RJ from (13). The obtained region is identical to the result
in [4, Theorem 1] where the enrollment channel is noiseless
(X = Y ) and the template rate can be arbitrarily large. Also,
this characterization corresponds to the region given by Günlü
and Kramer [6, Theorem 1] with only one individual. It is
easy to check this claim by just setting RI = 0. Moreover,
it is worthy mentioning that Kittichokechai and Caire [10]
studied a similar model. They analyzed the model provided
that there is an adversary at the decoder and characterized the
capacity region by using two RVs as well. In the case where
there is no assumption of adversary, it is easy to confirm that
the characterization in this paper is equivalent to their result
[10, Theorem 1] by similar arguments in the proof of (15)
(Appendix A).
A numerical example of the rate region given by the right-
hand side of (13) where RS = 0 is shown in Fig. 2. This
is a three-dimensional figure of RI (z-axis) as a function of
RJ (x-axis) and RL (y-axis), and the figure was plotted under
the following settings. We assume that alphabets X ,Y , and
Z are binary. We fix source probability PX(0) = 0.5 and
transition probability of channels PY |X(0|0) = PY |X(1|1) =
PZ|X(0|0) = PZ|X(1|1) = 0.9. The region below the curved
surface of Fig. 2 is the achievable rate region, which is a
convex region, and it stretches in the direction of blue arrow.
Fig. 3 shows a projection of the rate region onto the RJRI
plane and the colored area represents the achievable area of
the rate pair (RJ , RI). Apparently, the area behaves in the
same manner as the capacity region of RI and RJ shown in
[3].
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We take a standard information theoretic approach; we
divide the proof into the achievability (direct) part and the
converse part.
A. Achievability (Direct) Part
First, we fix δ > 0 arbitrarily small, and a block length
n. We also fix test channels PU |Y and PV |U . We set RI =
I(Z;V )−δ, RS = I(Z;U |V )−δ, RJ = I(Y ;U)−I(Z;U)+
I(Z;V ) + 3δ, and RL = I(X;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ) + 3δ.
We also set MI = 2nRI , MS = 2nRS , and MJ = 2nRJ ,
respectively.
Random Code Generation:
Sequences vnm are generated i.i.d. from PV for m ∈ [1, NV ],
where NV = 2n(I(Y ;V )+δ). For each m, sequences unk|m
are generated from the memoryless channel PUn|V n=vnm
for k ∈ [1, NU ], where NU = 2n(I(Y ;U |V )+δ). The in-
dexes of these NU codewords are permuted by an uni-
formly distributed permutation pim on [1, NU ] and divided
equally into NB = 2n(I(Y ;U |V )−I(Z;U |V )+2δ) bins. That
is, the first bin contains {u˜n1|m, · · · , u˜nMS |m}, the second
bin contains {u˜nMS+1|m, · · · , u˜n2MS |m}, and so on, where
u˜nk|m = upi−1m (k)|m denotes the kth codeword after the permu-
tation. Consequently, each bin contains MS codewords in a
random order. Bins are indexed by b ∈ [1, NB ] and codewords
inside a certain bin are indexed by s ∈ S . Without loss of
generality, there exists a one-to-one mapping between k and
the pair (b, s).
Encoding (Enrollment):
When encoder f observes the bio-data sequence yni ,
the encoder looks for (m, k) such that (yni , v
n
m, u
n
k|m) ∈
A
(n)
 (Y V U). In case there are more than one such pairs, the
encoder picks one of them uniformly at random. Assume that
the encoder found a corresponding pair (m, k) = (m(i), k(i))
satisfying the jointly typical condition above. We set the
template j(i) = (m(i), b(i)) and the secret data to be the
corresponding codeword’s index s(i) in bin b(i) *1. j(i) is
stored at position i in the database and s(i) is handed back to
individual i. If there do not exist such m and k, then we set
j(i) = (1, 1) and s(i) = 1.
Decoding (Identification):
The decoder has access to all records in the database
{(m(1), b(1)), · · · (m(MI), b(MI))}. When decoder g sees
zn, the noisy version of identified individual sequence xnw,
it checks whether the codeword pair (vnm(i), u
n
b(i),s|m(i)) is
jointly typical with zn or not for all i ∈ I with some s ∈ S ,
i.e. (zn, vnm(i), u
n
b(i),s|m(i)) ∈ A(n) (ZV U). If there exists a
unique pair (i, s) for which this condition holds, then the
decoder outputs (ŵ, ŝ(w)) = (i, s) as the estimated index
and secret data, respectively. Otherwise, the decoder outputs
the index of the template (1, 1) as wˆ and ŝ(w) = 1 if
(i) there does not exist such a pair (i, s), (ii) such a pair
(i, s) exists but there are some s′ 6= s (s′ ∈ S) such that
(zn, vnm(i), u
n
b(i),s′|m(i)) ∈ A(n) (ZV U) satisfies, or (iii) such
a pair (i, s) exists but there are some i′ 6= i such that the pair
(vnm(i′), u
n
b(i′),s′|m(i′)) is jointly typical with z
n for some s′.
Analysis of Error Probability:
We evaluate the ensemble average of the error probability,
where the average is taken over randomly chosen codebook Cn,
which is defined as the set {V nm, Unk|m,Πm : m ∈ [1, NV ], k ∈
[1, NU ]}, where Πm denotes the RV corresponding to the
permutation operations of the set {Un1|m, · · · , UnNU |m} for
given m. Let the pair (M(i),K(i)) = (M(i), B(i), S(i))
denote the RVs corresponding to the index pair (m(i), k(i)) =
(m(i), b(i), s(i)) of sequences V nm and U
n
k|m determined by
the encoder for Y ni . For individual W = w, possible event of
errors occurs at the encoder is:
E1: {(Y nw , V nm, Unk|m) /∈ A(n) (Y V U)
for all m ∈ [1, NV ] and k ∈ [1, NU ]},
and those at the decoder are:
E2: {(Zn, V nM(w), UnB(w),S(w)|M(w)) /∈ A(n) (ZV U)},
*1Since there is a one-to-one mapping between k and (b, s), we identify k(i) with
(b(i), s(i)).
E3: {∃s′ 6= S(w) s. t.
(Zn, V nM(w), U
n
B(w),s′|M(w)) ∈ A(n) (ZV U)},
E4: {∃i′ 6= w and ∃s′ s. t.
(Zn, V nM(i′), U
n
B(i′),s′|M(i′)) ∈ A(n) (ZV U)}.
Then, the error probability for W = w can be bounded as
max
w∈I
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = w}
= Pr {E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 ∪ E4}
(a)
≤ Pr {E1}+ Pr {E2|Ec1}+ Pr {E3}+ Pr {E4} , (16)
where (a) follows because Pr {E1, E2} = Pr {E1} +
Pr {E2 ∩ Ec1} ≤ Pr {E1}+ Pr {E2|Ec1}.
Pr{E1} can be made smaller than δ for large enough
n by the standard technique of typical sets because
1
n logNV = I(Y ;V ) + δ > I(Y ;V ) and
1
n logNU =
I(Y ;U |V ) + δ > I(Y ;U |V ). For Pr {E2|Ec1}, it can
also be made smaller than δ by the Markov lemma
[11, Lemma 15.8.1]. By applying the packing lemma
[12], Pr {E3} and Pr {E4} are arbitrarily small for large
enough n since 1n logMS = I(Z;U |V )− δ < I(Z;U |V )
and 1n logMI +
1
n logMS = I(Z;U)− 2δ < I(Z;UV ), re-
spectively.
Therefore, the ensemble average of the error probability can
be made that
max
w∈I
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = w} ≤ 4δ (17)
for large enough n.
Hereafter we shall check bounds of identification, secrecy,
secrecy-leakage, template, and privacy-leakage rates averaged
over randomly chosen codebook Cn.
Intermediate Steps:
We consider a virtual system, where a partial decoder gi
is employed, for deriving the upper bound on the privacy-
leakage rate. In this system, knowing index i and seeing Zni
(defined as the output sequence of Xni via PZ|X ), the partial
decoder gi estimates only the secret data of individual i as
Ŝ(i) = gi(Z
n
i , J(i)). Note that this system is just for analysis,
and the partial decoder is not actually used during the decoding
process.
For any given i ∈ I, the partial decoder gi operates as fol-
lows: observing zni and the template j(i) = (m(i), b(i)) in the
database, it looks for s ∈ S such that (zni , vnm(i), unb(i),s|m(i)) ∈
A
(n)
 (ZV U). It sets ŝ(i) = s if there exists an unique s.
Otherwise, it outputs ŝ(i) = 1. The potential events of error
probability for this case are E2 and E3. Letting Pe(i) be the
error probability of gi, we readily see that
Pe(i) ≤ Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ 4δ, (18)
where the middle term in (18) denotes the error probability of
g (in the original BIS) for individual W = i.
The function of this partial decoder enables us to bound the
following conditional entropy
H(S(i)|Zni , J(i), Cn)
(b)
≤ H(S(i)|Ŝ(i))
(c)
≤ nδn, (19)
where
(b) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(c) follows because (18) is applied and we define δn =
1
n (1 + 4δ logMS).
Lemma 1. (Kittichokechai et al. [13])
Assume that (Xn, Y n, Un) are -strongly typical with high
probability*2. Then, it holds that
1
n
H(Y n|Un, Cn) ≤ H(Y |U) + δ′n, (20)
1
n
H(Y n|Xn, Un, Cn) ≤ H(Y |X,U) + δ′n, (21)
where δ′n is a positive value satisfying δ
′
n ↓ 0.
(Proof) The proofs can be found in [13, Appendix C].
Lemma 2. It holds that
1
n
H(Y ni |J(i), S(i), Cn) ≤ H(Y |U) + δ′n, (22)
where δ′n > 0 and δ
′
n ↓ 0.
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix B-A.
Analyses of Identification and Template Rates:
From the parameter settings of achievability scheme, it is
straight-forward that the conditions (7) and (9) hold.
Analysis of Secrecy Rate:
We can show that
1
n
H(S(i)) ≥ RS − 2δ − δ′n. (23)
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix B-B.
Analysis of Secrecy-Leakage:
We can show that
1
n
I(J(i);S(i)) ≤ 2δ + δ′n. (24)
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix B-C.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
In view of (11), we start by expanding the privacy-leakage
rate 1nI(X
n
i ; J(i)|Cn) as
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)|Cn) =
1
n
H(J(i)|Cn)− 1
n
H(J(i)|Xni , Cn)
≤ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ) + 3δ
− 1
n
H(J(i)|Xni , Cn). (25)
*2It means that Pr{(Xn, Y n, Un) ∈ A(n) (XY U)} → 1 as n → ∞, where
A(n) (XY U) denotes the set of -strongly typical sequences.
Next, let us focus solely on the conditional entropy in (25). It
can be evaluated as
1
n
H(J(i)|Xni , Cn)
=
1
n
H(Y ni , J(i)|Xni , Cn)−
1
n
H(Y ni |J(i), Xni , Cn)
(d)
=
1
n
H(Y ni |Xni , Cn)−
1
n
H(Y ni |M(i), B(i), Xni , Cn)
(e)
= H(Y |X)− 1
n
H(Y ni |M(i), B(i), S(i), Xni , Cn)
− 1
n
I(S(i);Y ni |M(i), B(i), Xni , Cn)
≥ H(Y |X)− 1
n
H(Y ni |M(i), B(i), S(i), Xni , Cn)
− 1
n
H(S(i)|M(i), B(i), Xni , Cn)
(f)
= H(Y |X)− 1
n
H(Y ni |M(i), B(i), S(i), Uni , Xni , Cn)
− 1
n
H(S(i)|M(i), B(i), Xni , Zni , Cn)
(g)
≥ H(Y |X)− 1
n
H(Y ni |Uni , Xni , Cn)
− 1
n
H(S(i)|M(i), B(i), Zni , Cn)
(h)
≥ H(Y |X)−H(Y |X,U)− δ′n
− 1
n
H(S(i)|M(i), B(i), Zni , Cn)
(i)
≥ H(U |X)−H(U |Y )− (δn + δ′n), (26)
where
(d) follows since J(i) is a function of Y ni and we have
J(i) = (M(i), B(i)),
(e) follows because Y ni and X
n
i are independent of Cn,
(f) follows because UnB(i),S(i)|M(i) is denoted by U
n
i and it is
a function of the tuple (M(i), B(i), S(i)) for the second
term, and the Markov chain S(i)−(M(i), B(i), Xni )−Zni
holds for a given codebook in the last term,
(g) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(h) is due to (21) in Lemma 1,
(i) follows because J(i) = (M(i), B(i)) and Fano’s inequal-
ity in (19) is applied.
From (25) and (26), we obtain
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)|Cn) ≤ H(U)−H(U |Y )− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V )
+H(U |Y )−H(U |X) + 3δ + δn + δ′n
≤ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V )
+ 3δ + δn + δ
′
n
≤ RL + δ (27)
for all sufficiently large n.
Finally, applying the selection lemma [14, Lemma 2.2] to all
results shown above (i.e., Eqs. (17), (23), (24), and (27)), there
exists a codebook satisfying all the conditions in Definition 1
for all large enough n.
B. Converse Part
For the converse proof, we consider a more relaxed case
where identified individual index W is uniformly distributed
over I and (6) is replaced with the average error criterion
Pr{(Ŵ , ̂S(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))} ≤ δ. (28)
We shall show that the capacity region, which is not smaller
than the original one R, is contained in the right-hand side of
(14).
We assume that a rate tuple (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is achievable
so that there exists a pair of encoder and decoder (f, g) such
that all conditions in Definition 1 with replacing (6) by (28)
are satisfied for any δ > 0 and large enough n.
Here, we provide other key lemmas used in this part. For
t ∈ [1, n], we define auxiliary RVs Ut and Vt as Ut =
(Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )) and Vt = (Zt−1, J(W )), respectively.
We denote a sequence of RVs XnW = (X1(W ), · · · , Xn(W ))
and Y nW = (Y1(W ), · · · , Yn(W )).
Lemma 3. The following Markov chains hold
Zt−1 − (Y t−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))− Yt(W ), (29)
Zt−1 − (Xt−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))−Xt(W ). (30)
(Proof) The proofs are given in Appendix C-A.
Lemma 4. There exist some RVs U and V which satisfy Z −
X − Y − U − V and
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Vt) = nI(Z;V ), (31)
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut) = nI(Z;U), (32)
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Ut) = nI(Y ;U), (33)
n∑
t=1
I(Xt(W );Ut) = nI(X;U). (34)
(Proof) The proofs are provided in Appendix C-B.
In the subsequent analyses, we fix auxiliary RVs U and V
specified in Lemma 4.
Analysis of Identification Rate:
Again note that we are considering the case where W is
uniformly distributed in the converse part, and we have
logMI = H(W )
= H(W |JMI , Zn) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
(a)
= H(W |JMI , Zn, Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
(b)
≤ H(W |Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
≤ H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(W ;JMI , Zn), (35)
where
(a) holds because (Ŵ , ̂S(W )) is function of JMI and Zn,
(b) follows because conditioning reduces entropy.
Continue bounding the second term in (35),
I(W ;JMI , Zn) = I(W ;JMI ) + I(W ;Zn|JMI )
(c)
= I(W ;Zn|JMI )
= H(Zn|JMI )−H(Zn|JMI ,W )
(d)
= H(Zn|J(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ),W )
(e)
≤ H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W ),W )
= H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W ))
=
n∑
t=1
{
H(Zt)−H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ))
}
=
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Vt)
(f)
= nI(Z;V ), (36)
where
(c) follows because W is independent of other RVs,
(d) follows because only J(W ) is possibly dependent on Zn,
(e) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(f) follows because of (31) in Lemma 4.
Thus, from (7), (35), (36), and Fano’s inequality as in (19),
we obtain
RI ≤ I(Z;V ) + δ + δn, (37)
where δn = 1n (1 + δ logMIMS) and δn ↓ 0 as n→∞.
Analysis of Secrecy Rate:
This analysis is similar to the analysis of identification rate,
which we have already seen above. We begin by considering
the entropy of secret data as follows:
H(S(W )) = H(S(W )|JMI , Zn) + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
= H(S(W )|JMIZn, Ŵ , ̂S(W ))
+ I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
≤ H(S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
≤ H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
= H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(S(W );JMI )
+ I(S(W );Zn|JMI )
(g)
= H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W )) + I(S(W ); J(W ))
+ I(S(W );Zn|J(W )), (38)
where (g) follows because bio-data sequence of each individ-
ual is generated independently so only J(W ), S(W ), and Zn
are possibly dependent on each other.
For the third term in (38),
I(S(W );Zn|J(W ))
= H(Zn|J(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))
= H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))
− (H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W )))
(h)
=
n∑
t=1
{
H(Zt)−H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))
}
−
n∑
t=1
{
H(Zt)−H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ))
}
=
n∑
t=1
{
I(Zt;Ut)− I(Zt;Vt)
}
(i)
= n(I(Z;U)− I(Z;V )), (39)
where
(h) holds because each symbol of Zn is i.i.d,
(i) holds due to (31) and (32) in Lemma 4.
Therefore, from (8), (10), (38), (39), and Fano’s inequality,
we have
RS ≤ I(Z;U)− I(Z;V ) + 2δ + δn. (40)
Analysis of Template Rate:
It can be shown that
RJ + δ ≥ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V )− δn. (41)
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix C-C.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
From (11), it follows that
n(RL + δ) ≥ max
w∈I
I(Xnw; J(w))
≥ I(XnW ; J(W )|W ) = I(XnW ; J(W ))
= I(XnW ; J(W ), S(W ), Z
n)− I(XnW ;Zn|J(W ))
− I(XnW ;S(W )|J(W ), Zn). (42)
Now let us focus on each term in (42) individually. For the
first term,
I(XnW ; J(W ), S(W ), Z
n)
= I(XnW ; J(W ), S(W )) + I(X
n
W ;Z
n|J(W ), S(W ))
(j)
≥ I(XnW ; J(W ), S(W )) +H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))
−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW )
(k)
≥
n∑
t=1
{
H(Xt(W ))
−H(Xt(W )|Zt−1, Xt−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))
}
+
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW )
(l)
≥
n∑
t=1
{
H(Xt(W ))−H(Xt(W )|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))
}
+
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Ut)−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW )
=
n∑
t=1
{
I(Xt(W );Ut) +H(Zt|Ut)
}
−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW ),
(43)
where
(j) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(k) holds from (30) in Lemma 3,
(l) follows because conditioning reduces entropy.
For the second term,
I(XnW ;Z
n|J(W )) = H(Zn|J(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW )
=
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ))
−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW )
=
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Vt)−H(Zn|J(W ), XnW ),
(44)
For the last one,
I(XnW ;S(W )|J(W ), Zn) ≤ H(S(W )|J(W ), Zn)
= H(S(W )|JMI , Zn)
= H(S(W )|JMI , Zn, Ŵ , ̂S(W ))
(m)
≤ H(S(W )|Ŵ , ̂S(W ))
(n)
≤ nδn, (45)
where
(m) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(n) follows due to Fano’s inequality.
Finally, substituting (43)–(45) into (42), the last terms in (43)
and (44) cancel out each other, and we obtain
RJ + δ ≥ 1
n
n∑
t=1
{I(Xt(W );Ut) +H(Zt|Ut)−H(Zt|Vt)}
− δn
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
{I(Xt(W );Ut)− I(Zt;Ut) + I(Zt;Vt)}
− δn
= I(X;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V )− δn, (46)
where (46) follows due to (31), (32), and (34) in Lemma 4.
Eventually, letting n → ∞ and δ ↓ 0 in (37), (40), (41),
and (46), we can see that the capacity region is contained in
the right-hand side of (14).
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we discuss the bounds
on the cardinalities of auxiliary RVs. For proving the bound
on the cardinality of alphabet U in the region A1 (cf. (13)), we
use the support lemma in [12, Appendix C] to show that RV
U should have |Y|−1 elements to preserve PY and add three
more elements to preserve H(Z|U), H(Y |U), and H(X|U).
This implies that it suffices to take |U| ≤ |Y|+2 for preserving
A1. Similarly, to bound the cardinalities of alphabets U and V
in the region A2 (cf. (14)), we also utilize the same lemma to
show that |V| ≤ |Y|+ 3 and |U| ≤ (|Y|+ 2)(|Y|+ 3) suffice
to preserve PY , H(Z|V ), H(Z|U) (= H(Z|U, V )), H(Y |U),
and H(X|U).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we deployed a method using two auxiliary
RVs to characterize the capacity region of identification,
secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in the BIS. We
demonstrated that the characterization using two auxiliary RVs
reduce to the one using only an auxiliary RV. Compared to the
model proposed in [4] and [3], what we newly imposed on our
model are:
• treating a noisy channel in the enrollment phase,
• considering a scheme of both compressing template (as
in [3]) and protecting privacy (as in [4]),
• analyzing the capacity region provided that the prior
distribution of an identified individual is unknown.
As special cases, it can be checked that our characterization
reduces to the one in [4] where the enrollment channel is
noiseless and there is no constraint on the template rate, and
it also coincides with the one derived by Günlü and Kramer
[6] where there is only one individual. For the future works,
as we have seen in Remark 3 about the relation between A1
and A2, this is a positive hint that Theorem 1 can be reproved
by a scheme using only one auxiliary RV and now this task is
under way. We also plan to analyze the capacity regions of the
BIS under strong secrecy criterion regarding secrecy-leakage.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUATION (15)
In the proof, we show the equivalence of A1 and A2
by removing the cardinality bounds of auxiliary RVs U and
V from both the regions. Once the equivalence without the
cardinality bounds is established, the cardinality bounds follow
from the standard arguments (cf. [12]).
It is obvious that A2 ⊆ A1, so we shall show that
A2 ⊇ A1. We assume that (RI , RS , RJ , RL) ∈ A1, meaning
that (RI , RS , RJ , RL) satisfies all conditions in (13) for some
PU |Y . Especially, we have RI + RS ≤ I(Z;U). We choose
the test channel PV |U satisfying that
RI = I(Z;V ). (47)
Such PV |U always exists since I(Z;U) ≥ I(Z;V ) ≥ 0
and I(Z;V ) is a continuous function of PV |U . Under that
condition, it is easy to check that (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is also an
element lying in the region A2.
APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY PROOFS FOR ACHIEVABILITY PART
A. Proof of Lemma 2
In [4], a similar result of this lemma is used without the
proof. Here, we will provide a proof for readers’ sake.
Note that J(i) = (M(i), B(i)). We start by considering the
conditional entropy in the left-hand side of (22) as
1
nH(Y
n
i |J(i), S(i), Cn)
= 1nH(Y
n
i |M(i), B(i), S(i), Cn)
(a)
= 1nH(Y
n
i |M(i), B(i), S(i), Uni , Cn)
(b)
≤ 1nH(Y ni |Uni , Cn)
(c)
≤ H(Y |U) + δ′n (48)
where
(a) holds because we denote UnB(i),S(i)|M(i) as U
n
i for sim-
plicity and the tuple (M(i), B(i), S(i)) determines Uni
for a given codebook,
(b) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(c) follows because Y ni and U
n
i are jointly typical with high
probability and (20) in Lemma 1 is applied.
B. Analysis of Secrecy Rate
The secrecy rate can be evaluated as follows:
1
n
H(S(i)|Cn)
=
1
n
{
H(Y ni , J(i), S(i)|Cn)−H(J(i)|S(i), Cn)
−H(Y ni |J(i), S(i), Cn)
}
(d)
≥ 1
n
{
H(Y ni )−H(J(i)|Cn)
−H(Y ni |J(i), S(i), Cn)
}
(e)
≥ H(Y )− (I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ) + 3δ)
− (H(Y |U) + δ′n)
= I(Z;U)− I(Z;V )− 3δ − δ′n
(f)
= RS − 2δ − δ′n, (49)
where
(d) holds because (J(i), S(i)) is a function of Y ni ,
(e) follows because 1nH(J(i)|Cn) ≤ RJ = I(Y ;U) −
I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ) + 3δ and Lemma 2 is applied,
(f) holds because we set RS = I(Z;U)− I(Z;V )− δ.
C. Analysis of Secrecy-Leakage
The amount of leaked information about S(i) from J(i) can
be expanded as
1
n
I(J(i);S(i)|Cn)
=
1
n
{H(S(i)|Cn) +H(J(i)|Cn)−H(Y ni , J(i), S(i)|Cn)
+H(Y ni |J(i), S(i), Cn)}
=
1
n
H(S(i)|Cn) + 1
n
H(J(i)|Cn)− 1
n
H(Y ni )
+
1
n
H(Y ni |J(i), S(i), Cn)
(g)
≤I(Z;U |V )− δ + I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U |V ) + 3δ −H(Y )
+H(Y |U) + δ′n
=2δ + δ′n, (50)
where (g) follows because 1nH(J(i)|Cn) ≤ RJ = I(Y ;U) −
I(Z;U) + I(Z;V ) + 3δ and Lemma 2 is applied.
APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY PROOFS FOR CONVERSE PART
A. Proof of Lemma 3
First, we prove that (29) holds. The joint distribution among
Zt−1, Y t(W ), J(W ), and S(W ) can be developed as
PZt−1,Y t(W ),J(W ),S(W )(z
t−1, ytw, j(w), s(w))
=
∑
ynw,t+1∈Yn−t
{
PY n
W
(ynw) · PJ(W ),S(W )|Y nW (j(w), s(w)|ynw)
· PZt−1|Y n
W
,J(W ),S(W )(z
t−1|ynw, j(w), s(w))
}
(a)
=
∑
ynw,t+1∈Yn−t
{
PY n
W
(ynw) · PJ(W ),S(W )|Y nW (j(w), s(w)|ynw)
· PZt−1|Y n
W
(zt−1|ynw)
}
=
∑
ynw,t+1∈Yn−t
{
PY n
W
(ynw) · PJ(W ),S(W )|Y nW (j(w), s(w)|ynw)
}
· PZt−1|Y t−1(W )(zt−1|yt−1w )
= PY t(W ),J(W ),S(W )(y
t
w, j(w), s(w))
· PZt−1|Y t−1(W )(zt−1|yt−1w )
(b)
= PY t−1(W ),J(W ),S(W )(y
t−1
w , j(w), s(w))
· PYt(W )|Y t−1(W ),J(W ),S(W )(ywt|yt−1w , j(w), s(w))
· PZt−1|Y t−1(W ),J(W ),S(W )(zt−1|yt−1w , j(w), s(w)),
(51)
where
(a) holds because (J(W ), S(W )) is a function of Y nW ,
(b) follows because of the Markov chain Zt−1−Y t−1(W )−
(J(W ), S(W )).
Similarly, equation (30) can be shown as follows:
PZt−1,Xt(W ),J(W ),S(W )(z
t−1, xtw, j(w), s(w))
=
∑
ynw∈Yn
{
PY n
W
(ynw) · PJ(W ),S(W )|Y nW (j(w), s(w)|ynw)
· PXt(W )|Y n
W
,J(W ),S(W )(x
t
w|ynw, j(w), s(w))
· PZt−1|Xt(W ),Y n
W
,J(W ),S(W )(z
t−1|xtw, ynw, j(w), s(w))
}
(c)
=
∑
ynw∈Yn
{
PY n
W
(ynw) · PJ(W ),S(W )|Y nW (j(w), s(w)|ynw)
· PXt(W )|Y n
W
,J(W ),S(W )(x
t
w|ynw, j(w), s(w))
· PZt−1|Xt(W ),Y n
W
(zt−1|xtw, ynw)
}
(d)
=
∑
ynw∈Yn
{
PY n
W
(ynw) · PJ(W ),S(W )|Y nW (j(w), s(w)|ynw)
· PXt(W )|Y n
W
,J(W ),S(W )(x
t
w|ynw, j(w), s(w))
}
· PZt−1|Xt−1(W )(zt−1|xt−1w )
= PXt(W ),J(W ),S(W )(x
t
w, j(w), s(w))
· PZt−1|Xt−1(W )(zt−1|xt−1w )
(e)
= PXt−1(W ),J(W ),S(W )(x
t−1
w , j(w), s(w))
· PXt(W )|Xt−1(W ),J(W ),S(W )(xwt|xt−1w , j(w), s(w))
· PZt−1|Xt−1(W ),J(W ),S(W )(zt−1|xt−1w , j(w), s(w)),
(52)
where
(c) holds because (J(W ), S(W )) is a function of Y nW ,
(d) follows due to the i.i.d. property of each symbol and the
Markov chain Zt−1 −Xt−1(W )− Y t−1(W ),
(e) follows because of the Markov chain Zt−1−Xt−1(W )−
(J(W ), S(W )).
B. Proof of Lemma 4
We will prove only (31) by the well-known argument
(cf. [11]). We introduce a timesharing variable Q which is
uniformly distributed over {1, 2, · · · , n} and is independent
of all other RVs. The left-hand side of (31) can be rewritten
as
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Vt) = n
{
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Vt|Q = t)
}
= nI(ZQ;VQ|Q)
= n[I(ZQ;VQ, Q)− I(ZQ;Q)]
= nI(ZQ;VQ, Q). (53)
By denoting V = (VQ, Q) and Z = ZQ, (31) obviously holds.
The proof of (32)–(34) can be done similarly by setting X =
XQ and Y = YQ.
To complete the proof, we need to verify that Zt−Xt(W )−
Yt(W )−Ut−Vt holds. We shall first check that Zt−Xt(W )−
Yt(W )− Ut holds for any t ∈ [1, n]. To prove this claim, we
have to verify that
Zt −Xt(W )− Yt(W ), (54)
Xt(W )− Yt(W )− Ut, (55)
Zt − (Xt(W ), Yt(W ))− Ut. (56)
Indeed, Eqs. (54) and (55) clearly hold so the remain-
ing task is to check if the last one also holds. Be-
fore checking that, we show that the Markov chain
Zt − (Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))− (J(W ), S(W )), which will
be used to confirm (56), holds.
I(Zt; J(W ), S(W )|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
= H(Zt|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
−H(Zt|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ), J(W ), S(W ))
(f)
≤ H(Zt|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
−H(Zt|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Y nW , J(W ), S(W ))
(g)
= H(Zt|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
−H(Zt|Zt−1, Xt(W ), Y nW )
(h)
= H(Zt|Xt(W ))−H(Zt|Xt(W ))
= 0, (57)
where
(f) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(g) holds because (J(W ), S(W )) is a function of Y nW ,
(h) holds because each symbol of bio-data sequences is i.i.d.
and we have Zt −Xt(W )− Yt(W ).
From (57), it means that the conditional mutual information is
zero and thus Zt − (Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))− (J(W ), S(W ))
forms a Markov chain.
Equation (56) can be checked as follows:
I(Zt;Ut|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
= H(Ut|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))−H(Ut|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt)
= H(Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
−H(Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt)
= H(Zt−1|Xt(W ), Yt(W ))
+H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
−H(Zt−1|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt)
−H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt, Zt−1)
(58)
(i)
= H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
−H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1, Zt)
(j)
= H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
−H(J(W ), S(W )|Xt(W ), Yt(W ), Zt−1)
= 0, (59)
where
(i) holds because every symbol of bio-data sequences is i.i.d.
generated so the first and third terms in (58) cancel each
other,
(j) follows because Zt −(Zt−1, Xt(W ), Yt(W ))−
(J(W ), S(W )) holds (cf. (57)).
Thus, Zt − Xt(W ) − Yt(W ) − Ut holds, and since Vt is a
function of Ut, it follows that Zt−Xt(W )−Yt(W )−Ut−Vt
also forms a Markov chain.
C. Analysis of Template Rate
It follows from (9) that
n(RJ + δ)
≥ logMJ ≥ H(J(W ))
= I(Y nW ; J(W ))
= I(Y nW ; J(W ), S(W ), Z
n)− I(Y nW ;Zn|J(W ))
− I(Y nW ;S(W )|J(W ), Zn). (60)
Likewise in the analysis of privacy-leakage rate, now let us
focus on each term in (60) separately. For the first term,
I(Y nW ; J(W ), S(W ), Z
n)
= I(Y nW ; J(W ), S(W )) + I(Y
n
W ;Z
n|J(W ), S(W ))
=
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))−H(Yt(W )|Y t−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))
}
+H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ), Y nW )
(k)
=
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))
−H(Yt(W )|Zt−1, Y t−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))
}
+
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))−H(Zn|Y nW )
(l)
≥
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))−H(Yt(W )|Zt−1, J(W ), S(W ))
}
+
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Ut)− nH(Z|Y )
=
n∑
t=1
{
I(Yt(W );Ut) +H(Zt|Ut)
}
− nH(Z|Y ), (61)
where
(k) holds from (29) in Lemma 3 and (S(W ), J(W )) is a
function of Y nW ,
(l) follows because conditioning reduces entropy.
For the second term,
I(Y nW ;Z
n|J(W )) = H(Zn|J(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ), Y nW )
=
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Zt−1, J(W ))−H(Zn|Y nW )
=
n∑
t=1
H(Zt|Vt)− nH(Z|Y ) (62)
and the last term can be bounded by the same quantity as seen
in (45):
I(Y nW ;S(W )|J(W ), Zn) ≤ nδn. (63)
Finally, substituting (61)–(63) into (60) and taking similar
steps as in (46), we obtain
RL + δ ≥ 1
n
n∑
t=1
{I(Yt(W );Ut)− I(Zt;Ut) + I(Zt;Vt)}
− δn
= I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) + I(Z;V )− δn, (64)
where (64) follows due to (31)–(33) in Lemma 4.
